UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 145:1359 loaded and no ammunition was included in the sale." 8 The Cannons left the meeting and were immediately arrested. Things got worse for the defendants. A federal statute "imposes a mandatory five year sentence for the use of a firearm, but increases the term to thirty years if the firearm is a machine gun." 9 Thus, because Keating had the foresight to bring a machine gun, the Cannons, who had held "an unloaded machine gun in [their] possession.., for a matter of moments," faced an additional twenty-five years in prison.' 0 The district court refused to sentence the defendants to an extra twenty-five years in prison. The court noted that " [t] here was no legitimate law enforcement purpose served" by selling the machine gun." "The decision to arrest had been made prior to the meeting, and the presence of the machineguns [sic] could not make the defendants any more guilty of the offense than they would have been if only handguns had been.., purchased." 2 Because "the machineguns [sic] were nothing more than a gratuitous experiment" to increase the defendants' sentence by six-fold, the court held that the officers' conduct constituted sentencing manipulation, and as a result excluded the machine gun from consideration at sentencing.1
The Cannons' case is one among many. Under the recently adopted Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing Guidelines" or "Guidelines"), crimes are quantified based upon the amount of harm caused. 4 In the Cannons' case, the guns were quantified. A firearm was worth five years, a machine gun twenty-five more. The Sentenc-ing Guidelines rarely account for individual and extenuating circumstances. Thus, the fact that the Cannons may not have been predisposed to purchase the machine guns or the fact that the undercover agents might have encouraged them to purchase the machine guns was irrelevant to their sentences. As a consequence, undercover agents such as Keating and Sherbrooke can structure their stings and busts to maximize sentences. Some courts have responded, as the Cannon district court did, by adopting sentencing manipulation or sentencing entrapment as defenses to the sentences that would otherwise be imposed by the Sentencing Guidelines.
This Comment inquires into the authority of a federal court to adopt new sentencing defenses. Part I explains the desirability of sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation as defenses against sentences that would otherwise be imposed by the Sentencing Guidelines. Both sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation defenses would mitigate the harsh consequences of the Sentencing Guidelines, counter improper police conduct, and tailor sentences to fit a defendant's culpability.
The desirability of a defense, however, does not necessarily give a court the authority to adopt it. Part II defines sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation. Because these defenses are still in their formative years, no single definition for either defense has emerged. For purposes of this Comment, a careful definition of each defense is important because whether a court has the authority to establish a defense depends on what the defense purports to do. Part III considers the possible legal foundations of the sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation defenses. This Comment concludes that a court would be overstepping its authority if it adopted either the sentencing entrapment or sentencing manipulation defenses. Yet, the problems of police misconduct and sentences unrelated to culpability remain. Thus, Part IV considers which branch, if not the judicial branch, could best formulate a remedy.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF SENTENCING DEFENSES: THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND PROBLEMS THEREIN

A. Sentencing Before 1984: The Height ofJudicial Discretion
Sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation would not exist were it not for recent changes in the way federal courts sentence
B. Reform and the Sentencing Guidelines: Quantity-Driven Punishment
In 1984, in response to the criticisms, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act.
The Sentencing Reform Act created the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") as an agency within the judiciary.2 Over the next three years, the Commission developed the Sentencing Guidelines, which went into effect in 1987. 2 Through the Sentencing Guidelines, the Commission sought to achieve uniformity in sentencing. 24 "Uniformity in sentencing" means that similar criminals, committing similar crimes, will receive substantially similar sentences.2 To achieve uniformity, the Commission established a 258-box grid. Along one axis of the grid lies the severity of the offense. To the extent possible, the Commission quantified the severity of an offense. 5 For example, in the case of drug crimes the severity of the offense is based on the amount of drugs a defen-27 dant has bought, sold or possessed. In economic crimes such as complaints regarding the pre-1984 sentencing structure. Critics also attacked the parole system which determined the actual length of a sentence served. SeeJohnson, supra note 15, at 202 ("Since the Parole Commission controlled when a prisoner would be released, the sentence imposed by ajudge was not the actual amount of time a defendant would serve." (footnote omitted)). Parole added another element of disparity to the system. See id. ("[A] judge might sentence a defendant to twelve years, but the Parole Commission could release him after four." (footnote omitted)). 21 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2019 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. (1994)).
See28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994) . 2 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2 (1995). The Commission submitted the proposed Guidelines to Congress for review on April 13, 1987. The Guidelines "took effect on November 1, 1987, and apply to all offenses committed on or after that date." Id. at 1. 24 See id. at 2. The Commission had three goals it sought to achieve through the Guidelines: honesty, uniformity and proportionality in sentencing. See id. "Honesty in sentencing" meant that a defendant would serve the actual length of the sentence imposed by the court, rather than be released on parole before the sentence was halfserved; this required the abolition of the parole system. See id. at 1-2. "Proportionality in sentencing" meant that the Guidelines would impose "appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity" and of differing harm. See id. at 2. However, Commissioner Ilene Nagel admitted that "the Sentencing Commission was more concerned with uniformity-making sentences alike, than with proportionality-insuring the likeness of those grouped together for similar sentences." Johnson, supra note 15, at 206. 25 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2 (1995) .
See Underhill, supra note 15, at 192 ("In creating proportionality in sentencing, Congress sought to punish larger quantities of certain crimes more severely because they were considered more harmful.").
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1; see also Sandra Guerra, The
New Sentencing Entrapment and Sentence Manipulation Defenses, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP.
1997]
UNIVERS1TY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 145:1359 fraud, money laundering, bribery or counterfeiting, the severity of an offense is determined by the amount of money involved in the illicit transaction.2 Additionally, a criminal's sentence might be stepped up due to an aggravating factor such as the presence of a gun,2 the transaction's proximity to a school, 3 0 or the involvement of a pregnant woman in the transaction.
3 '
Along the other axis of the grid lie the offender's characteristics. The Guidelines limit the personal characteristics a judge may consider. Initially, Congress indicated that a judge could consider a "defendant's age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition, physical condition (including drug dependence), previous employment record, family ties and responsibilities, community ties, role in the offense, criminal history, and dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood."0 2 Additionally, a judge was supposed to consider the defendant's state of mind as well as her purpose in committing the crime. 33 By the time the Commission submitted its proposed Sentencing Guidelines to Congress, only three factors were deemed relevant to setting a sentencing range: (1) a defendant's past criminal history; (2) her dependence upon the criminal activity for her livelihood; and (3) her acceptance of responsibility for the crime.-In 1989, the requirement that judges consider a defendant's motives was deleted as "unnecessary." 5 In this way, the focus of the Sentenc-ing Guidelines shifted from considering the defendant to considering only the amount of harm caused.
6
A judge follows the grid-plotting the severity of the offense against the offender's characteristics-to the appropriate sentencing 37 range and imposes a sentence within that range. The range is narrow. Before the Sentencing Guidelines were enacted, judges were able to choose a sentence anywhere within a range of zero to twentyfive years 3 s Under the Sentencing Guidelines the maximum possible sentence cannot exceed the minimum by more than twenty-five percent or six months, whichever is greater. 9 Ostensibly, judges are allowed to depart from the grid if they find
that the case at bar presents unusual circumstances. In practice, however, departures are rare. The Sentencing Guidelines limit departures only to "'circumstance [s] of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. '-4 ' and state "that despite the courts' legal freedom to depart from the guidelines, they will not do so very often. By quantifying the severity of most offenses, restricting the individual characteristics a court may consider, and limiting the ability to depart from the grid, the Sentencing Guidelines aimed to impose substantially similar sentences on criminals committing similar offenses.
C. Quantity-Driven Punishment and the Creation of New Problems
The attempt-through the Sentencing Guidelines-to eliminate the disparities under the old sentencing system, however, gave rise to new problems and criticisms." 
Sentences Manipulated by Law Enforcement
One important criticism levied against the Sentencing Guidelines is that it shifts too much discretion to prosecutors and undercover in-. 47 vestigators.
In undercover operations, the prosecutor determines same belief that most fact patterns had been accounted for. See U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 6 (1995) ("[T]he guidelines, offense by offense, seek to take account of those factors that the Commission's data indicate made a significant difference in pre-guidelines sentencing practice.").
(Edwards, J., concurring) ("The appellate cases show a disparity between the relative ease of upward departure and the niggardly application of downward adjustments. 49 or more money to filter through an economic crime. 0 An undercover agente 1 can also affect the length of a sentence by choosing the type of drugs sold (the penalty for selling crack cocaine is approximately twice that of selling powder cocaine),52 the location of a sale (e.g., near a school), or whether particular firearms are present. 53 With so many decisions to make and each decision explicitly worth a certain number of months on the sentencing grid, prosecutors and undercover agents can directly influence the sentence a defendant will receive.-4 abuse.... In undercover sting operations, where the government often controls the execution of the crime, the potential for abuse is heightened.").
43 See Saul M. Pilchen, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Undercover Sting Operations: A Defense Perspective, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 115, 115 (1991) (discussing prosecutorial discretion in guiding undercover sting operations). 4 See, e.g., United States v. Lenfesty, 923 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1991) (recapping the defendant's charge that the police agent's only motive "in repeatedly purchasing drugs from her was to increase both the amount of drugs in the conspiracy and her sentence"); United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1993 ) (quoting the district court judge who found that "it was 'not at all fortuitous that the agent arrested [Barth] only after he had arranged enough successive buys to reach the magic number (referring to 50 grams, the quantity that triggers the application of the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence)'").
W 
Punishment Unrelated to Culpability
A second criticism of the Sentencing Guidelines is that the punishments imposed do not accurately reflect a defendant's culpability."s For instance, the Sentencing Guidelines impose longer sentences for larger quantities of drugs. The presumption was that larger quantities would accurately reflect a person's position in a drug-selling organization.H In fact, drug kingpins hire couriers and sellers who, when caught, will be sentenced as if they were kingpins. The harsh sentences for less culpable defendants occur because judges can consider very few of the individual circumstances surrounding a crime and must base their sentencing decision almost entirely upon the amount of harm involved.
58
If the prosecutor or the undercover agent is, in fact, orchestrating the illicit conduct to ensure the maximum sentence, further questions arise about a defendant's culpability and whether her sentence is appropriate. For instance, a person may decide to commit one criminal act but not a second criminal act. An undercover agent, sentences, prosecutors also admit to using manipulation to arrive at lesser sentences. knowing that the defendant will be incarcerated longer if she commits a second criminal act, may encourage the individual to commit that second act. 5 9 If both acts are in fact committed, the sentencing court will sentence the defendant in accordance with the commission of both crimes without consideration for the defendant's original intent. 6° This is so, despite the fact that, were it not for the police instigation, the second criminal act might never have been committed. In this way, questions arise whether the punishment in fact matches a defendant's culpability. 61 See Guerra, supra note 27, at 184 ("Presumably a person who sells, buys or transports drugs as a profession is more culpable than one who succumbs to the temptation to make quick cash on one occasion."); Underhill, supra note 15, at 192 (comparing the relative culpability of a defendant who set out to purchase 150 pounds of marijuana with the culpability of a defendant who set out to buy 30 pounds of marijuana but was encouraged and did purchase 150 pounds).
62 38 F.3d 1103 38 F.3d (9th Cir. 1994 When Staufer met the undercover agent, Staufer expressed that he wanted to sell 5000 doses of LSD. The undercover agent, however, insisted that Staufer sell 10,000 doses. When Staufer expressed reluctance, the undercover agent readily suggested that he would pay more. 66 Further arrangements were made and Staufer did eventually sell the 10,000 doses to the undercover agent. Prior to this incident, Staufer had sold drugs only once before. At that time, Staufer had bought twenty-five to thirty doses of LSD for fifteen dollars. He then sold some of it to friends who gave him eight dollars in return.
7
Staufer is the first and only case in which a court of appeals has explicitly acknowledged sentencing entrapment as a defense and upheld a downward departure on that basis. 66 In upholding the downward departure, the court indicated the same two concerns discussed above: that government agents should not manipulate sentences and that the sentence under the Guidelines inaccurately reflected the defendant's culpability. The court stated that government abuse can be discouraged and corrected only if courts also are able to ensure... that defendants are predisposed to engage in a drug deal of the magnitude for which they are prosecuted. Furthermore, courts can ensure that the sentences imposed reflect the defendants' degree of culpability only if they are able to reduce the sentences of defendants who are not predisposed to engage in deals as large as those induced by the government. Similar concerns were voiced by the district court in United States v. Shepherd. 70 Shepherd was charged with one sale of powder cocaine, two sales of crack cocaine, and the possession of a firearm during one of the transactions.
7 ' On the two occasions in which Shepherd sold crack cocaine, she originally intended to sell powder cocaine. The undercover agent, however, insisted that Shepherd convert the pow- der to crack.2 Converting powder cocaine to crack takes only a few minutes of "cooking" in a microwave oven. r The agent was fully aware that if Shepherd converted the powder to crack and then sold it, she would be subject to a much lengthier sentence. 7 4 In fact, had Shepherd's sentence been calculated based upon the sales of crack cocaine, she would have received a sentence of ten to eleven years.7s The lower court calculated her sentence based on the intended sales of powder cocaine. By that calculation, Shepherd's sentence was reduced by half-to only five years. 7 6
The legal basis for the Shepherd court's downward departure is unclear from the decision. The court stated that the police practices denied the defendant her right to "due process"77 but also fully discussed sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation. 7 8 The court's policy concerns were also made clear in the opinion. The court first focused on the conduct of the law enforcement agent and lamented that "[t] he ability of a law enforcement officer to enhance a defendant's sentence through his own actions to [an] enormous degree strikes at the very heart of our system ofjustice."7 But the court also "believe [d] thatjustice, fairness and the tailoring of a sentence to address a defendant's actual culpability retain a place within our system." 0 Accordingly, the Shepherd court "determined that it [was] appropriate to calculate the defendant's sentence ... as if the sales had involved only cocaine powder rather than crack." 8 ' Whatever the legal basis for its decision, the court obviously was concerned about manipulation of the defendant's sentence by law enforcement and thus attempted to tailor the defendant's sentence to her actual culpability. 
II. SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT AND SENTENCING MANIPULATION DEFINED
The terms "sentencing entrapment" and "sentencing manipulation" are closely related and often confused terms. In order to consider whether the courts have the legal authority to adopt new defenses, the definition and goal of each defense must be clear.
A. SentencingEntrapment
The term "sentencing entrapment" was coined first. In United States v. Lenfesty, s2 the Eighth Circuit defined sentencing entrapment as "outrageous official conduct [that] overcomes the will of an individual predisposed only to dealing in small quantities [of drugs] ."3 This definition encompasses two ideas: (1) outrageous official conduct and (2) the predisposition of the individual. These two ideas have since been parsed out and applied to two separate defenses.
84
The sentencing entrapment defense relates to an individual's predisposition. "Sentencing entrapment" is the claim that the defendant, although predisposed to commit a lesser offense, is coerced into committing a greater offense with a correspondingly greater punishment. 85 The focus of the sentencing entrapment defense is the defendant's mental state-whether she was predisposed to commit the crime to the extent that she did. While many courts and commentators have made an effort to distinguish the two defenses, confusion and overlap still remain in many court decisions. For the purposes of this Comment, however, sentencing entrapment will refer to a claim based on the defendant's lack of predisposition and sentencing manipulation to a claim of police misconduct.
85 See United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 614 (8th Cir. 1991) ("'Sentencing entrapment' as defined by the defendant, posits the situation where a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped into committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment."); United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing the Stuart court's definition); Underhill, supra note 15, at 167 (defining sentencing entrapment).
86 See Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1103. 5000 doses of LSD. Upon the undercover agent's insistence and his offer of more money, Staufer sold 10,000 doses. 7 Because Staufer denied a predisposition to committing the crime to the extent charged, Staufer's is a sentencing entrapment claim. The Ninth Circuit in Staufer is the only court of appeals to recognize sentencing entrapment and grant a downward departure on that basis. The Eighth Circuit recognizes the defense but has never found facts warranting a downward departure. 8 s The remaining circuits have either rejected sentencing entrapment as a theory," 9 have not decided whether sentencing entrapment is a recognized defense, 9 or have recognized sentencing manipulation instead of sentencing entrapment.'9
B. Sentencing Manipulation
Whereas sentencing entrapment focuses on the defendant's predisposition, sentencing manipulation focuses on the government's conduct. A sentencing manipulation claim asserts that a defendant should not be sentenced as heavily as strict adherence to the Guidelines would otherwise require because the government acted outrageously or improperly for the sole purpose of increasing the defen- 94 The undercover agent planned to arrest the defendants after their last meeting. The district court found that while the defendants had never before asked to buy a machine gun, the agent brought one to the final meeting and encouraged the defendants to buy the machine gun knowing that, if the defendants took the bait, the machine gun would add twenty-five years to their sentences.
95
No court of appeals has departed downward on the basis of a sentencing manipulation claim.
96 Nonetheless, the First, Sixth, Eighth The court believed the defendant could have argued for either one. In a sentencing entrapment claim, the defendant would have argued that she was predisposed only to sell powdered cocaine and not crack. Her sentence, therefore, should have been based on the type of drug she intended to sell, not the type she was entrapped into selling. In a sentencing manipulation claim, the defendant would have argued that the undercover agent had acted improperly by pressuring her to sell a type of drug she had not been inclined to sell when the sole reason for doing so was to increase her sentence. The overlap of the two doctrines is clearly seen in the court's own language. The court wrote:
The defendant, though predisposed to sell cocaine, was asked to cook the cocaine for the sole purpose of increasing her resulting sentence. Under such circumstances, this conduct is specifically designed to manipulate the sentence received by undermining the defendant's due process rights. This purpose and practice must be viewed as outrageous. Thus, both doctrines are implicated.103
This Comment, however, will distinguish the two defenses. Sentencing entrapment will refer to a claim based upon the defendant's lack of predisposition. Sentencing manipulation will refer to a claim based upon police misconduct. . 1996 ) (suggesting sentencing manipulating should be considered under the "outrageous governmental conduct" standard but failing to explicitly adopt a sentencing manipulation defense); United States v. Egemonye, 62 F.3d 425, 426 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that "where government agents have improperly enlarged the scope or scale of the crime, the sentencing court has power to exclude the tainted transaction" but offering no explanation regarding the legal basis for that standard (internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424-25 (8th 1993) (holding that "sentencing entrapment may be legally relied upon to depart under the sentencing guidelines" but failing to explain the legal theory which allows such a departure); United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 111, 112 (D.D.C. 1994) (granting a downward departure because the government conduct had "undermin[ed] the defendant's due process rights"--suggesting a constitutional basis for the departure-and because "the Judici-Since both sentencing defenses make claims similar to the traditional entrapment defense, this Comment begins the search for an underlying legal justification by examining the development of the traditional entrapment defense. An understanding of the legal authority on which the traditional entrapment defense was based may elucidate a court's present authority to establish new but similar defenses. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that the theories offered to support the traditional entrapment defense do not support the adoption of either sentencing manipulation or sentencing entrapment defenses.
III. THE LEGAL THEORY OF SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT
A. Legal Underpinnings of the Entrapment Defense-Precursor to Sentencing Entrapment and Sentencing Manipulation
While the entrapment defense is now thoroughly accepted, 0 5 the Supreme Court's authority to adopt the traditional entrapment defense has been debated since the defense was first established. Hanewicz, supra note 106, at 1177-78 ("The [majority] approach is labelled 'subjective' because it centers upon the state of mind (or predisposition) of the defendant.").
not undoing legislation" 8 or putting forth new public policy. " Both functions would be outside the domain of the judiciary. Rather, the majority kept to the traditional function of the judiciary, which is to construe statutes as they are written by the legislature. 20 The majority claimed that the legislature did not intend that an "otherwise innocent" defendant should be prosecuted. 2 2 By narrowly construing the legislative intent, the majority excluded the defendant from the impact of the statute. In the decades that followed the Sorrells decision, in Sherman v. United States,'22United States v. Russells and Jacobson v. United States, the Supreme Court consistently upheld the subjective approach and its foundation in legislative intent.
Criticism of the Majority Approach
Criticism of the subjective approach began the moment the Sorrells decision was decided. In his concurring opinion in Sorrells, Justice Roberts described the majority decision as "strained and unwarranted. " '2s Since then, critics of the subjective approach have questioned whether in fact Congress intended to exclude nonpredisposed defendants from the scope of all criminal statutes.
2 6 Jus-11 See Sorrels, 287 U.S. at 450 ("Judicial nullification of statutes, admittedly valid and applicable, has, happily, no place in our system.").
See id. at 445-46 ("To the suggestion of public policy the objectors answer that the legislature, acting within its constitutional authority, is the arbiter of public policy and that, where conduct is expressly forbidden and penalized by a valid statute, the courts are not at liberty to disregard the law and to bar a prosecution .... It is manifest that these arguments rest entirely upon the letter of the statute." (citation omitted)).
12 See id. at 450 ("We conceive it to be our duty to construe the statute here in question reasonably, and we hold that it is beyond our prerogative to give the statute an unreasonable construction .... ").
1
See id. at 448 (stating that the Court was "unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused" for the purpose of luring someone "otherwise innocent" to the commission of a crime). In Sorrells and its progeny, the minority based its entrapment defense on the right of the Court to preserve its own integrity. 35 At the time of Sormells, the Court was still arguing over the extent of its authority to control the administration of criminal justice in the 
Criticism of the Minority Approach
The objective approach, however, has not escaped criticism.
Criticism of the objective approach rests largely on whether the Court in fact possesses its self-declared supervisory authority. The Court first established its supervisory authority in McNabb v. United States. ' There, the Supreme Court excluded two murder confessions after the defendants were held for two days and repeatedly questioned without any contact with family, friends or counsel. '4 Holding the defendants for two days was contrary to federal law which required that the men be arraigned promptly.'" The fact that the police had failed to arraign the men, however, should not have been grounds for excluding the confessions. As the dissent indicated, prior to McNabb, a confession was admissible so long as it was given voluntarily. 45 In fact, the majority admitted that the use of confessions obtained in this manner was not contrary to law.1 6 Nevertheless, the McNabb Court excluded the confessions on the basis that, were the Court to admit the evidence, the Court would be-276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928) , to argue for the Court's supervisory authority to support the entrapment defense. SeeUnited States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442-43 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Brandeis's argument that a prosecution should be stopped "in order to protect the Government. To protect it from illegal conduct of its officers. To preserve the purity of its courts."); see also Beale, supra note 105, at 1443 (describing Justice Brandeis's arguments supporting the court's supervisory authority); Note, The Judge-Made Supervisoiy Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEO. LJ. 1050 , 1067 -69 (1965 [hereinafter Judge-Made Supervisory Power] (noting the minority's reliance on the Court's supervisory authority as a basis for the entrapment defense).
141 See Russe, 411 U.S. at 442-43 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the purpose of the entrapment defense is to "prohibit unlawful governmental activity.., and to preserve the purity of [the] courts" (internal quotations omitted)).
318 U.S. 332 (1943).
14 See id. at 341 ("Quite apart from the Constitution, therefore, we are constrained to hold that the evidence elicited from the petitioners in the circumstances disclosed here must be excluded." For example, the exclusionary rule established in McNabb falls outside the province of any rules enabling act because it arose from the specific facts of a particular case rather than from a standardized rulemaking process that Congress had authorized.
The only other prong upon which the Court's supervisory authority might rest is its inherent or implied powers. The Court's inherent powers are those that are necessary for the Court to function. recognition of the Court's supervisory authority rests on the Court's implied powers and time. It acknowledges that "it is helpful and in some instances necessary" for the Court to adopt procedural rules. 6 ' Furthermore, the Court's "special competence in dealing with technical matters of the litigation process" makes it best suited to formulate these necessary rules. 6 6 Time also validates the Court's use of its supervisory authority. In the fifty-three years since McNabb, the Supreme Court has been using supervisory authority as a basis of opinion. In only two instances has Congress acted to overrule the Supreme Court.6 If only through time and acquiescence, the Courts' use of supervisory authority has gained legitimacy' 64 This limited recognition of the Court's supervisory authority does not, however, countenance the adoption of rules that regulate the conduct of law enforcement outside the courtroom. 6 ' Such rules exceed the scope of the Court's supervisory authority. The Court's "special competence regarding technical matters of judicial administration provides no justification" for regulating out-of-court conduct0 6 6 Recently, the Supreme Court has recognized this limited interpretation of the Court's supervisory authority. In its 1992 decision United States v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that a court's supervisory authority should not be used to dictate prosecutorial conduct outside the courtroom. 6 7 163 See id. at 1454. One commentator suggests that rulemaking authority has traditionally been a shared function, not the sole prerogative of the legislature. See JudgeMade Supervisory Power supra note 140, at 1054 ("[T]he argument over who had the power to adopt uniform rules of procedure for the district courts was resolved pragmatically by co-action of the legislature and the judiciary....").
: 36, 46-47 (1992) ("We did not hold.., that the courts' supervisory power could be used, not merely as a means of enforcing or vindicating legally compelled standards of prosecutorial conduct ... but as a means of prescribing those standards of prosecutorial conduct in the first instance-just as it may be used as a means of establishing standards of prosecutorial conduct before the courts themselves.").
UNIVERSITY OFPENSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 145:1359 Whether the criticisms are levied against the subjective or objective versions of the entrapment defense, the Court's original authority to establish the defense was questionable. The subjective entrapment defense derives from a legislative intent that may or may not have existed. The objective entrapment defense relies on the Court's supervisory authority, which may not extend to the creation of rules regulating the executive branch. These questions regarding the Court's authority to establish the entrapment defenses are equally applicable to a lower court's authority to establish a sentencing defense. Before turning to the question of a lower court's authority to establish sentencing defenses, however, another defense-one related to the objective entrapment defense-must be considered.
B. Outrageous Government Conduct: A Constitutional Defense
While the objective approach has never garnered enough votes on the Court to supersede the subjective approach, it did give rise to a similar defense whose legal validity is not questioned. In 1973, in United States v. Russell,' the Court refused to recognize the objective approach, but acknowledged that "we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction." 6 9
The "outrageous government conduct" defense is similar to the objective entrapment defense in that it focuses on the conduct of law enforcement agents.
70
The most significant difference, however, is that the outrageous government conduct defense is grounded in the Constitution whereas the objective entrapment defense is grounded in the Court's supervisory authority.'7 theories underlying the entrapment defense.'n Sentencing entrapment follows the path laid out by the subjective entrapment defense. The subjective entrapment defense claims that because the defendant lacked a predisposition to commit the crime, she should not be prosecuted. Sentencing entrapment admits that the defendant was predisposed to commit a criminal act but denies that the defendant was predisposed to commit as serious a crime as the one with which she is now being charged. Both defenses rely on the defendant's state of mind-one to justify eliminating punishment, the other to mitigate it. Sentencing manipulation follows the objective entrapment defense and the outrageous government conduct defense. Both the objective entrapment defense and the outrageous government conduct defense protect a defendant from prosecution in the event of police misconduct. Similarly, sentencing manipulation focuses on police misconduct as a rationale for mitigating a defendant's sentence. Some courts recognizing sentencing manipulation have followed the constitutional standard outlined in Russell and required outrageous government conduct to justify a downward departure at sentencing 74 Other courts have required only a showing of improper conduct.', Presumably, a court adopting the improper conduct standard does so pursuant to its supervisory authority. 76 The final similarity between the traditional entrapment defense and the new sentencing defense is that theoretical questions remain about each defense's proper legal foundations. The difference between the entrapment defense and the sentencing defenses is that, despite theoretical questions regarding its legal underpinnings, the entrapment defense has been accepted for over sixty years.'" Since
C. SentencingEntrapment and Sentencing Manipulation: Following in the Footsteps of Entrapment
1
The sentencing defenses are now following an identical developmental path as the entrapment defense did fifty years ago. In both instances, political and legal developments gave rise to abusive police tactics. Where Prohibition preceded the entrapment defense, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines preceded the sentencing defenses. Ultimately, the courts became concerned about the tactics and began considering new defenses. The one difference between the development of the traditional entrapment defense and the sentencing defenses is that with the traditional entrapment defense, the courts were much more explicit about debating their authority to establish the new defense. No such debate has occurred with sentencing defenses.
174 See infra note 205 and accompanying text. Congress has not acted to restrict or eliminate it, the defense has gained legitimacy. 78 Sentencing defenses, however, have not yet been legitimated by the passage of time. Sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation are still less than a decade old and have not yet been acknowledged by the Supreme Court. As courts across the country recognize both sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation, it is appropriate to ask now, at the outset, whether either defense rests on a solid legal foundation.
D. The Lower Courts'Authority to Adopt Sentencing Entrapment
Sentencing entrapment, which focuses on the defendant's predisposition, follows the subjective approach. The subjective approach relies on the theory that Congress did not intend to criminalize a non-predisposed defendant. Thus the validity of sentencing entrapment will rest on the finding of a legislative intent to decrease the punishment of less culpable defendants. Appropriately, when the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Staufer granted a downward departure based on a sentencing entrapment claim, it looked to the Sentencing Guidelines to support the defense.' This Section will discuss the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Application Note 15 to the Sentencing Guidelines and the difficulty of otherwise using legislative intent as a basis for a sentencing entrapment defense.
Application Note 15180 as a Foundation for Sentencing Entrapment
In United States v. Staufer, described above, the defendant was arrested when he agreed to sell 10,000 doses of LSD when he had originally offered to sell only 5000 doses. ' The Staufer court relied on Application Note 15 which was added in 1993, one year prior to Staufer. Application Note 15 reads: pra note 106, at 835 nn. 37 & 38. 178 See Beale, supra note 105, at 1519 ("Perhaps the entrapment defense itself has been legitimated by four decades of congressional acquiescence.").
If, in a reverse sting (an operation in which a government agent sells or negotiates to sell a controlled substance to a defendant), the court finds that the government agent set a price for the controlled substance that was substantially below the market value of the controlled substance, thereby leading the defendant's purchase of a significantly greater quantity of the controlled substance than his available resources would have allowed him to purchase except for the artificially low price set by the government agent, a downward departure may be warranted.1 2 Application Note 15 does not actually apply to the facts of Staufer. Application Note 15 requires that the defendant be caught in a reverse sting operation. A reverse sting occurs when the government agent is the seller and the defendant the buyer.'
83 Staufer was selling to, not buying from, an undercover agent.
s4 This is a straight sting. Furthermore, while the court found that the undercover agent offered more money in exchange for more doses of LSD, the court did not find that the agent had offered an "artificially" high price. ' Nonetheless, by generalizing the language of Application Note 15, the Staufer court found a legislative intent to justify a downward departure. The Staufer court argued that under Application Note 15, the Sentencing Commission had "expressly" recognized that government agents should not be allowed to structure any undercover operations so as purposely to increase a defendant's sentence.
The court further concluded that Application Note 15 indicated Congress's intent that courts should consider a defendant's predisposition and capacity to engage in the transaction for which she is being 187 charged .
The court explained that while the application note referred to only one type of transaction, the note indicated the Sentencing Commission's awareness of "the unfairness and arbitrariness" of undercover agents who pressure defendants in order to increase a defendant's sentence. See id. ("[T] he Sentencing Commission now expressly recognizes that ... courts may take into consideration the predisposition and capacity of the defendant to engage in a deal of the magnitude for which he or she was convicted.").
lesser crime. As such, a sentencing entrapment defense resting on legislative intent would be equally "strained and unwarranted."
The Commission was not overly concerned that punishment reflect a defendant's blameworthiness. If anything, the Sentencing Commission seemed particularly unconcerned about an individual's particular culpability or predisposition. As mentioned above, Congress initially recommended that a judge consider, among other things, a "defendant's... mental and emotional condition .... family ties and responsibilities, community ties, role in the offense, criminal history, and dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood,"' 9 6 as well as the defendant's intent and purpose in committing the crime. 1 9 7 The Commission, however, found that only three factors were relevant to sentencing: (1) a defendant's past criminal history; (2) her dependence upon the criminal activity for her livelihood; and (3) her acceptance of responsibility for the crime. 98 In 1989, the Commission deleted the requirement that judges consider a defendant's motives, deeming it "unnecessary."' 99 The Sentencing Guidelines is a quantity-based sentencing scheme where the subjective characteristics of the defendant have little if any role to play. 29 Claiming that it is the Commission's intent to exclude non-predisposed defendants from the scope of the Sentencing Guidelines would be, once again, "sheer fiction." 2°' In his concurring opinion in Sorrells, Justice Roberts made a basic point that is as equally applicable now as it was then. He stated that the only possible intention one could draw from the criminal statute , concurring in the result). The Guidelines state that a philosophical question arose whether punishment should be "scaled to the offender's culpability" or to "deterring others or incapacitating the defendant" and claim that no decision between the two philosophies was made. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 3 (1995) . Nonetheless, the resuiting structure of the Guidelines does not allow any consideration for a defendant's culpability. As the Guidelines explain, " [t] he larger the number of sub-categories of an offense and offender characteristics included in the guidelines, the greater the.., number of decisions required... [and] the greater the risk that different courts would apply the guidelines differently.., thereby reintroducing the very disparity that the guidelines were designed to reduce." Id. Thus the Guidelines chose to value similarity in sentences over sentences scaled to a defendant's culpability. See
Johnson, supra note 15, at 206. [Vol. 145:1359 is that the legislature intended to criminalize exactly the conduct the defendant had engaged in. 2°2 So too here, the only possible intention that one can draw from the Sentencing Guidelines is that Congress intended to punish individuals who committed criminal activity. Punishment is the point of the statute. The judges and commentators who wish to establish sentencing entrapment as a defense and escape the punishment otherwise imposed by the Sentencing Guidelines are moved by the fact that the defendant is not truly culpable to the extent to which she is being punished. If this-punishment uncorrelated to blame-is the ill a judge wishes to correct, and if the judge wishes to base the defense on legislative intent, she will have to show that the Commission intended to correlate punishment to blameworthiness. This is a difficult showing to make.
UNIVERS1TY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW
If sentencing entrapment is nonetheless recognized by the courts, such as it was in Staufer, and neither the Sentencing Commission nor Congress moves to overturn it, time may still legitimize the defense. This, of course, would require the courts to reach beyond their own authority and claim justification through congressional and administrative silence.
E. The Courts'Authority to Adopt Sentencing Manipulation
While the sentencing entrapment defense responds to the concern that defendants are being punished disproportionately to their blameworthiness, the sentencing manipulation defense responds to the concern that the police are acting improperly. Sentencing manipulation is thus a descendant of the objective approach, as both amount to a claim that a defendant should not be punished due to police misconduct. At first, a sentencing manipulation claim was predicated upon outrageous government conduct-that is, a constitutional violation. 0 3 While a constitutional violation offers a valid foundation to overturn a sentence, predicating a sentencing defense on a constitutional violation may not provide the remedy sought. More recently, the First Circuit has adopted a definition of sentencing ma- [960 F.2d 191 (lst Cir. 1992) ], the Eighth Circuit adopted the term 'sentence manipulation' for the theory that outrageous government conduct that offends due process couldjustify a reduced sentence.").
nipulation that requires only improper police conduct to support the defense. 0 4 The legitimacy of this approach depends upon whether adopting sentencing manipulation exceeds the scope of a court's supervisory authority.
Outrageous Government Conduct as a Foundation for Sentencing Manipulation
The Fourth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits would require "outrageous government conduct," that is to say, a constitutional violation, in order to prove a sentencing manipulation claim. If a sentencing manipulation defense is based on a constitutional violation, the court's authority is obvious. The court is enforcing the defendant's due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
The question arises, however, whether a new sentencing defense is necessary if the defendant has suffered a constitutional violation. Traditionally, a due process violation is remedied by dismissing the prosecution. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have noted that if a defendant can prove that the government acted outrageously, then the entire prosecution should be dismissed as a violation of due process rights. These courts reason that it is hard to imagine a situation in which a defendant's due process rights are violated to an extent warranting a downward departure, but not violated sufficiently to warrant a dismissal. tion, however, is not to subject isolated government conduct to a special brand of scrutiny when its effect is felt in sentence, as opposed to offense, determination.").
this is the authority upon which a court would rely to assert that it may exclude evidence if it is tainted by prosecutorial misconduct. A court using its supervisory authority to establish a defense would argue that the transactions tainted by manipulation should be excluded from sentencing calculations because the court cannot be an accomplice to police misconduct. Relying upon a court's supervisory authority, however, presents several difficulties. As noted above, a court's supervisory authority is quite arguably not grounded in the law. 213 Neither the Constitution nor specific legislation explicitly grants the courts their self-declared supervisory authority. Nor do the courts' inherent powers include the power to create a new rule to exclude relevant evidence from sentencing. An inherent power is one that is essential to a court functioning as a court. Historically, Congress, not the judiciary, established sentences.
2 1 4 For many years, therefore, establishing the rules for sentencing has not been essential to a court's ability to function as a court. If a court's supervisory authority rests upon its implied powers, such supervisory authority would not include the right unilaterally to adjust sentencing structures.
If, however, one accepts that the courts do have supervisory authority to establish some rules, the courts' authority in theory and by mandate is limited and does not permit courts to adopt rules that regulate police conduct. In United States v. Williams, the Court held that its supervisory power could not be used to dictate prosecutorial 215 standards outside the courtroom.
The lower federal courts have accordingly refused to exercise their supervisory power where its purpose would be to regulate prosecutorial conduct.
2 1 6 In the context of sentencing manipulation claims, several courts have expressed reluctance to interfere with police, who need "leeway [both] to probe the depth and extent of a criminal enterprise" and to establish proof be-213 See supra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
14 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. yond a reasonable doubt.'" This hands-off approach reflects the theory that regulating police tactics falls outside both the courts' special competence and their inherent authority.
As a result, lower courts cannot establish new sentencing defenses without overstepping their authority. The courts' supervisory authority does not extend far enough to establish a sentencing manipulation defense. A constitutionally based sentencing manipulation claim goes too far because the remedy is to bar the entire prosecution. Finally, the legislative intent behind the Guidelines is not broad enough to support a sentencing entrapment claim.
IV. RECOURSE TO THE LEGISLATURE
If the courts are overstepping their authority in establishing new sentencing defenses, how can the problem of sentencing entrapment and manipulation be resolved? Robert Underhill argues that because the entrapment and manipulation problem arises in the executive branch, the executive branch is best suited to address the problem. Underhill suggests that the problem could be solved by more strictly 219 regulating undercover agents and prosecutors.
In any undercover operation where the defendant would be subject to quantity-driven sentencing, the prosecutor would be responsible for investigating the purpose of the investigation, the reason the defendant was targeted, the rationale for the arrest, and the manner in which the quantity was determined.22° If the investigation revealed sentencing entrapment or manipulation, the prosecutor could, in extreme cases, drop the prosecution. In less extreme cases, the prosecutor could (1) exclude from the indictment any quantity of drugs or money that are attributed to the defendant as a result of entrapment or manipulation; or 218 See Underhill, supra note 15, at 197 (noting that the "executive branch is the ultimate source of the problem" and that "because the executive branch is charged with the task of executing the law, it has a responsibility to do so in a manner consistent with the intentions of Congress").
219 See id. See id. at 198 (proposing that these requirements be placed in a jurisdictional statement).
(2) "not disclose the additional quantities to the sentence-computing agency."2' Prosecutors failing to investigate and prosecute cases according to these standards would be subject to disciplinary action.2 This proposal is seemingly manageable. Conducting the investigation adds only a minimal burden to prosecutor's existing work. Before and during investigations, prosecutors are in communication with field agents. Thus, assessing the purpose and methods of the undercover investigation will merely formalize current practice. More carefully scrutinizing and restricting the work of agents in the field would prevent numerous abuses. Eliminating from sentencing any amount of money or quantity of drugs resulting from manipulation would more accurately reflect a defendant's culpability in sentencing.
Unfortunately, parts of Underhill's proposal may contradict the Sentencing Guidelines as recently interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Watts. 7 At issue in Watts was whether a defendant's sentence could be based not only upon conduct for which she was convicted, but also for conduct for which she was acquitted.
2 4 The Supreme Court ruled that "a jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence."2 In so ruling, the Court noted that the official commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines states that a court determining the applicable sentencing range may consider "[c]onduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense."2 6 And in some instances, such as drug convictions, the Sentencing Guidelines require that "all acts and omissions.., that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction" be considered by the sentencing court. Underhill's proposal is partly unworkable under Watts in that it infringes upon the court's authority, and in some instances duty, to consider all conduct surrounding an offense. If the prosecutor refuses to indict a defendant on a given charge or otherwise seeks to exclude some element of the investigation from the court's consideration based upon an investigator's conduct, the prosecutor is attempting to remove from the court's purview elements of the offense that the Supreme Court has indicated the sentencing court has the authority or obligation to consider.
A second problem with looking to the executive branch for a solution to sentencing abuses is that the executive branch is part of the problem. Prosecutors, like undercover agents, know the Sentencing Guidelines and know how to conduct a prosecution in order to maximize a potential sentence.2 8 Institutional changes are, of course, possible, but the fact of prosecutorial complicity in sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation suggests that an exclusively executive branch solution will prove insufficient. If neither the courts nor the executive branch is fully capable of resolving the dilemmas posed by sentencing entrapment and manipulation, this leaves the legislative branch. The legislative branch, through the Sentencing Commission, could resolve this dilemma by simply broadening the scope of Application Note 15. Application Note 15 currently limits a court's discretion to depart downward only to cases of reverse sting operations where the undercover investigator offered the defendant a price substantially below market value. The application note could be revised to allow a sentencing court to consider a downward departure in any case in which the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence2° that the defendant had no predisposition to engage in the relevant conduct or where the government agent engaged in conduct solely for the purpose of increasing the defendant's sentencing range.2 s Such an amendment does have a significant drawback. Namely, it reintroduces the discretion which the sentence must be based on clear and convincing evidence"). The Court's finding in part contradicts the purpose of the Guidelines. When district courts may choose which conduct to include to set the base offense level, some district courts will include the conduct, and others will not. This will result in different base offense levels for the same conduct and is exactly the type of disparity the Guidelines sought to eliminate.
See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
SeeU.S. SENTENCING GUIDEINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, Application Note 15 (1995) . 2N A preponderance of the evidence is the standard of proof required at sentencing. See Watts, 117 S. Ct. at 638. 231 For other suggestions regarding how the Guidelines might be appropriately amended to account for sentencing manipulation, seeJohnson, supra note 15, at 224.
DEF2DING A SENTENCE
Sentencing Guidelines were explicitly established to eliminate. On the other hand, such an amendment would merely shift discretion from the executive branch to the judicial branch with no net change in sentence discrepancy. Furthermore, such an amendment would eliminate otherwise tortured interpretations of the current Sentencing Guidelines to arrive at the same result, address the current problems of sentencing entrapment and manipulation, and allow courts to arrive at sentences that are more closely attuned to a defendant's actual culpability. A revised amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines implemented along with more supervision of undercover agents would do much to eliminate questionable sentences.
CONCLUSION
The search for sentencing defenses is an admirable one. Those courts advancing the theories of sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation wish to see that sentences are tailored to the individual's criminality and that police officers are held to civilized standards. Nonetheless, in establishing these defenses, courts are fundamentally altering the sentencing scheme duly established by Congress. Some sixty years ago, when the courts initially considered the entrapment defense, proponents offered two different legal bases for its establishment: legislative intent and the court's supervisory authority. Then, as now, neither is an entirely satisfactory ground for a court-developed defense to a legislative enactment. With regard to legislative intent, courts face an uphill battle to show that Congress, when it established a uniform sentencing structure based on harm, really meant to consider individual intent. With regard to supervisory authority, it is not clear that courts have the authority to create rules which effectively control activity of agents in the executive branch. The courts might, nonetheless, establish sentencing entrapment or sentencing manipulation defenses. If Congress fails to overturn the courts, over time these defenses will, like the original entrapment defense, gain legitimacy through use and Congressional acquiescence. Thus, despite the lack of legal grounding, sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation could become accepted defenses. Rather than advocating the establishment of these defenses through the back door, this Comment argues that the most legitimate and effective way to gain the protection for defendants that the courts are seeking is through a degree of self-regulation by the executive branch of the behavior of its undercover agents and a straightforward legislative amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines.
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